Technology shocks and monetary policy : assessing the Fed's performance by Galí, Jordi et al.
TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS
 AND MONETARY POLICY:
ASSESSING THE FED’S
PERFORMANCE
Jordi Galí, J. David López-Salido and
Javier Vallés
Banco de España
Banco de España — Servicio de Estudios
Documento de Trabajo n.º 0013
Technology Shocks and Monetary Policy:
Assessing the Fed’s Performance∗
Jordi Galí † J. David López-Salido‡ Javier Vallés§
September 28, 2000
∗We thank the comments by seminar participants at the Banco de España. The views expressed
here are those of the authors and do not represent the view of the Banco de España.
†New York University, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Banco de España
‡Banco de España
§Banco de España
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, we characterize the Fed’s
systematic response to technology shocks and its implications for U.S. output, hours
and inflation. Second we evaluate the extent to which that responses can be accounted
for by a simple monetary policy rule (including the optimal one) in the context of a
standard business cycle model with sticky prices. Our main results can be described
as follows: First, we detect significant differences across periods in the response of
the economy (as well as the Fed’s) to a technology shock. Second, the Fed’s response
to a technology shock in the Volcker-Greenspan period is consistent with a optimal
monetary policy rule. Third, in the pre-Volcker period the Fed’s policy tended to
over stabilize output at the cost of generating excessive inflation volatility. Hence our
evidence reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting an improvement in the
Fed’s performance.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Taylor (1993), many macroeconomists have shifted their
attention to the analysis of the endogenous component of monetary policy, and its
role in shaping the responses of nominal and real variables to different shocks. The
contribution of the present paper to that research program is twofold. First, we study
the behavior Federal Reserve (Fed) in response to a specific source of fluctuations:
technology shocks. Second, we evaluate the extent to which such a response approx-
imates the optimal one, or whether it can be accounted for by means of some other
simple rule, using a standard dynamic sticky price model as a reference framework.1
We provide evidence on the economy’s response to a technology shock that is based
on a structural VAR, estimated using U.S. quarterly data for the period 1954-1998.
Following the strategy adopted in Galí (1999), we identify a technology shock as the
only source behind the unit root in labor productivity. We analyze the estimated
dynamic responses of a number of real and nominal variables to that shock, and
attempt to assess how the observed reaction by the Fed may have influenced the
economy’s response. Furthermore, and motivated by recent evidence pointing to
significant changes over time in the Fed’s monetary policy rule, we split the sample in
two subperiods: the pre-Volcker period and the more recent Volcker-Greenspan era.2
Our theoretical analysis focuses on three alternative monetary policy rules. First,
we derive and characterize the optimal policy. In the context of our sticky price model
that policy is the one that stabilizes prices fully. We derive the equilibrium responses
to a technology shock of a number of variables under such a rule, and compare those
responses to the ones generated by two alternative specifications of monetary policy:
a simple Taylor rule and a constant money growth rule. We then confront the three
sets of theoretical responses with the empirical ones, and try to ascertain which rule—
if any— provides a better approximation to the systematic response of the Fed to the
supply shocks under consideration.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we detect significant dif-
ferences across periods in the response of interest rates, prices, and output to a tech-
nology shock. Second, the Fed’s response to such a shock in the Volcker-Greenspan
period is consistent with an optimal rule. Third, in the pre-Volcker period the Fed’s
policy tends to overstabilize output, at the cost of generating excessive inflation
volatility. Hence, our evidence reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting
an improvement in the Fed’s performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive and
characterize the economy’s equilibrium under the three rules considered. In section
1McGrattan (1999) and Dotsey (1999), among others, have recently emphasized the role of the
systematic component of monetary policy in determining the economy’s response to any type of
shock.
2See, e.g. Taylor (1999), Judd and Rudebusch (1999), and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) for
evidence of a regime change around the time Paul Volcker became the Fed’s chairman.
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3 we present our evidence on the Fed’s systematic response to technology shocks,
and compare the empirical responses with the theoretical counterparts. Section 4
concludes.
2 Technology Shocks and Monetary Policy in a
Sticky Price Model
2.1 A Baseline Sticky Price Model
In this section we lay out a simple sticky price model that will serve as a reference
framework for the analysis of the optimal monetary policy. Our model of choice is
a standard version of the Calvo (1983) model with staggered price setting. Next we
describe briefly the main ingredients.3
We assume a continuum of firms, indexed by subscript i ∈ [0, 1], each producing
a differentiated good with a technology
Yt(i) = At Nt(i)
where (log) productivity at ≡ log(At) follows the exogenous process:
∆at = ρ ∆at−1 + εt
with ρ ∈ [0, 1). For simplicity, and given our objective, we assume that such variations
in aggregate productivity are the only source of fluctuations in the economy.
The representative household is infinitely-lived and seeks to maximize
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
Ã
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
!
(1)
subject to a (standard) sequence of budget constraints and a solvency condition, and
where Ct ≡
³R 1
0 Ct(i)
ε−1
ε di
´ ε
ε−1 is a consumption index and N denotes hours of work.
The log-linearized Euler equation associated with the consumer’s problem, com-
bined with the market clearing condition Yt = Ct, yields:
yt = −1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1}− rr) + Et{yt+1} (2)
where yt denotes (log) aggregate output, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt+1 is the
rate of inflation between t and t+1, and rr ≡ − log β represents the steady state real
interest rate.
The labor market is perfectly competitive, with the labor supply schedule associ-
ated with the solution to the consumer’s problem being given by wt = σ ct + ϕ nt,
3A detailed derivation can be found in Woodford (1996) and Yun (1996), among others.
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where wt denotes the (log) real wage, and nt ≡ log(Nt). Hence, all firms face a
common real marginal cost mct = wt − at, which in equilibrium is given by (in logs)
mct = (σ + ϕ) yt − (1 + ϕ) at (3)
Each firm faces an isoelastic demand for its product (generated by the solution
to the consumer’s problem), and takes the path of aggregate variables as given. If
all firms adjust prices optimally each period (flexible prices), the price over marginal
cost markup is common across firms, constant over time, and equal to µ ≡ ε
ε−1 .
Accordingly, mct = − log µ ≡ mc, for all t. Hence, the equilibrium processes for (log)
output, (log) employment, and the expected real rate are independent of monetary
policy and given by:
y∗t = γ + ψ at
n∗t = γ + (ψ − 1) at
rr∗t = rr + σρψ ∆at
where ψ ≡ 1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
and γ ≡ mc
σ+ϕ
. We refer to the above equilibrium values as the natural
levels of (log) output, (log) employment, and the real interest rate, respectively.
If, on the other hand, firms face constraints on the frequency with which they
adjust prices, the markup (and, hence, the real marginal cost) will no longer be
constant. As a result a gap between output and its natural level may emerge, which
we denote by xt ≡ yt − y∗t and refer to as the output gap. It follows from (3) and
the previous definition that the output gap will be related to the percent deviation of
marginal cost from its steady state level, where the latter is assumed to correspond
to mc, i.e., its level under flexible prices. Formally, we have dmct = (σ + ϕ) xt.
The exact form of the equation describing aggregate inflation dynamics depends
on the way sticky prices are modeled. Here we follow Calvo (1983), and assume that
each firm resets its price in any given period only with probability 1−θ, independently
of other firms and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus, each period
a measure 1 − θ of producers reset their prices, while a fraction θ keep their prices
unchanged. In that case, the aggregation of optimal price-setting decisions can be
shown to yield the familiar new Phillips curve:
πt = β Et{πt+1}+ κ xt (4)
where κ ≡ θ−1(1− θ)(1− βθ)(σ + ϕ).
Finally, we can rewrite equilibrium condition (2) in terms of the output gap and
the natural rate of interest:
xt = − 1
σ
(rt −Et{πt+1}− rr∗t ) + Et{xt+1} (5)
Equations (4) and (5), together with a specification of monetary policy (i.e., of
how the interest rate is determined), describe the equilibrium dynamics of the model
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economy in the presence of exogenous variations in aggregate technology. Next we
analyze the economy’s response to such disturbances under alternative specifications
of monetary policy.
2.2 The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks
In this section we consider three alternative specifications of the systematic compo-
nent of monetary policy: the optimal monetary policy, a simple Taylor rule, and a
constant money growth rule (henceforth, a money rule). Our analysis focuses on how
the nature of that systematic component affects the equilibrium responses of different
variables to a permanent shock to technology.
2.2.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
The model economy described above may be plagued by a variety of distortions
(market power, valuable money, etc.). We follow a number of recent papers in the
literature and maintain the assumption that all such distortions, with the exception
of the existence of nominal rigidities, have already been corrected by means of ap-
propriate non-monetary interventions.4 Accordingly, the natural level of output and
employment coincide with their efficient levels. In such an environment monetary
policy should aim at attaining the allocation associated with the flexible price equi-
librium. Hence, the monetary authority focuses on correcting a distortion that is
monetary in nature. The optimal policy requires that
xt = πt = 0
all t.
Our baseline model turns out to have a simple and appealing property: the allo-
cation associated with the flexible price equilibrium can be exactly replicated with an
appropriate policy, at least under the assumption that productivity can be observed
contemporaneously by the monetary authority. Using (5), such allocation can be
implemented in practice using the interest rate rule
rt = rr + σρψ ∆at + φπ πt
for any φπ > 1.
5 Hence, the equilibrium behavior of the nominal rate rt (as well as
the real rate rrt) is represented by the process
rt = (1− ρ) rr + ρ rt−1 + σρψ εt
4See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Galí and Monacelli (1999), among others.
5The addition of the last term aims at eliminating the indeterminacy that would otherwise obtain.
For details see, e.g. Woodford (1999) and Galí (2000).
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The equilibrium response of output and employment will match that of their
natural levels:
∆yt = ρ ∆yt−1 + ψ εt
∆nt = ρ ∆nt−1 + (ψ − 1) εt
Thus, as in the flexible price case, a permanent technology shock leads to a pro-
portional change in output under the optimal policy, while the sign of the response
of employment depends on the strength of the wealth effect, as determined by the
size of σ. The lack of strong evidence of a unit root in hours in postwar U.S. data
suggests a value for σ (and hence ψ) equal or close to one. That property motivates
the calibration used below.
Notice also that the equilibrium behavior of the interest rate depends on the
persistence of productivity growth. Thus, when productivity is a pure random walk
(ρ = 0) both nominal and real interest rates remain constant.
2.2.2 A Simple Taylor Rule
Suppose now that the central bank follows the rule
rt = rr + φπ πt + φx xt (6)
i.e., the nominal rate responds systematically to the contemporaneous values of in-
flation and the output gap. This is a version of the rule put forward by John Taylor
as a good characterization of U.S. monetary policy, and analyzed in numerous recent
papers.6
Substituting out (6) into expressions (4) and (5) the equilibrium dynamics are
represented by the system:"
xt
πt
#
= AR
"
Et{xt+1}
Et{πt+1}
#
+BR ∆at
where
AR ≡ Ω
"
σ 1− βφπ
σκ κ+ β(σ + φπ)
#
; BR ≡ σρψΩ
"
1
κ
#
and Ω ≡ 1
σ+φx+κφπ
.
As is well known, there exists a range of values for coefficients (φx,φπ) such that
the equilibrium is indeterminate, giving rise to the possibility of sunspot fluctuations.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the previous dynamical system to have a
unique solution that depends on fundamentals only (and, hence, to have well defined
responses to a technology shock) is given by7
6See Taylor (1993, 1999).
7See, e.g., Bullard and Mitra (1999).
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κ (φπ − 1) + (1− β) φx > 0
Under that assumption the stationary solution takes the form"
xt
πt
#
= ρ
"
xt−1
πt−1
#
+ Γ εt
where Γ ≡ [Γx,Γπ]0 = [I−ρAR]−1BR. Given the equilibrium path for xt it is straight-
forward to solve for the corresponding trajectories of output and employment:
yt = γ + xt + ψ at
nt = γ + xt + (ψ − 1) at
with the equilibrium behavior of the nominal rate given by (6). Notice that in the
case of a random walk process for technology (ρ = 0), the Taylor rule supports the
optimal allocation.
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium responses of different variables to a technology
shock, under a simple Taylor rule, represented by the line with squares.The output
gap measured as the deviation of output from its potencial value may be considered
an unobservable variable. Therefore we calibrate the rule using the value suggested
in Taylor (1993) for the inflation response, namely, φπ = 1.5, but with φx = 0.0.
8 For
comparison purposes we also show the corresponding responses under the optimal
policy, represented by the line with triangles.The remaining parameters were set at
the following values: σ = 1, β = 0.99, ϕ = 1, ρ = 0.2, and θ = 0.75.
We observe that under the assumed Taylor rule output and employment increase
beyond their natural levels, which leads to a temporary rise in inflation. Hence, the
policy response implied by the Taylor rule appears not to be sufficiently contrac-
tionary. This is reflected in the fact that the path of the real rate under that rule lies
uniformly below the path associated with the optimal policy.
Notice, however, that the deviations from the optimal policy are quantitatively
small. Furthermore, they could be reduced further by choosing a more aggressive
response (higher values for φπ and φx). Yet, it should be clear that no finite values
for those parameters could possibly replicate the optimal responses. The reason is
straightforward: supporting the optimal response requires that prices remain stable
and that the real rate increases. Accordingly, the nominal interest rate should also
increase. But the rule will not generate a rise in the nominal rate unless a deviation
from the optimal response occurs (in the form of positive inflation or output gap).9
8The notion of output gap used in conventional Taylor rules will not generally correspond to the
model based concept of output gap being used here. In addition, a zero value for the coefficient φx
is also consistent with the small and insignificant coefficient of detrended output in the interest rate
policy estimations since 1980 (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)).
9It would take setting either φπ or φx equal to infinity to achieve the optimal allocation. Such
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2.2.3 A Monetary Targeting Rule
Suppose next that the monetary authority targets the rate of growth of the money
supply. Formally,
mt −mt−1 = γm (7)
wherem denotes the quantity of money in circulation, expressed in logs. The demand
for money holdings is assumed to take a conventional form:
mt − pt = yt − η rt
Lettingm∗t ≡ mt−pt−ψat we can rewrite the money demand in terms of stationary
variables only:
m∗t = xt − η rt
Furthermore, it follows from the definition of m∗t and (7) that
m∗t−1 = m
∗
t + eπt + ψ ∆at
where eπt ≡ πt − γm. The equilibrium dynamics are now represented by the system: xteπt
m∗t−1
 = AM
 Et{xt+1}Et{eπt+1}
m∗t
+BM ∆at
where, after letting Θ ≡ 1
1+ση
,
AM ≡ Θ
 ση η 1κση β(1 + ση) + κη κ
κση β(1 + ση) + κη 1 + ση + κ

BM ≡ ψΘ
 ρσηρκση
1 + ση(1 + ρκ)

The line with squares in Figure 2 represents the equilibrium responses of different
variables to a technology shock, under the assumption that the central bank keeps
the money supply unchanged. Again, the line with triangles displays the responses
under the optimal policy.
A comparison of the responses under the two rules makes clear that, in the face
of a favorable productivity shock, money targeting implies a monetary stance that is
too tight: the resulting path for the real interest rate lies uniformly above the optimal
a rule would potentially lead to huge instrument-instability: any small deviation of inflation or the
output gap from zero (perhaps resulting from small measurement errors or imperfect credibility)
would imply infinite changes in the rate. The lack of credibility of such a policy might be more than
warranted since it is inconsistent with the zero-bound on nominal rates.
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one. As a consequence, output does not increase as much as would be efficient, and
employment declines.10
Notice also that the nominal rate remains unchanged under the money rule. That
result, however, is not general: it hinges on our specific calibration of σ. More
generally, a money rule implies that the interest rate is given by:11
rt = rr + γm +
Ã
σ − 1
1 + η
! ∞X
k=1
Ã
η
1 + η
!k−1
Et{∆yt+k} (8)
Hence, if utility is logarithmic in consumption, the nominal rate is constant, and
independent of output dynamics.12 Furthermore, it is easy to show that money
targeting will generally lead to a suboptimal response of the economy to a technology
shock. The reason is simple: the optimal response requires that ∆yt = ψ∆at and
rt = rr + σρψ ∆at, for all t. But the latter conditions are not consistent with (8),
except for a very specific configuration of parameter values.13
How significant are the deviations from the optimal responses that follow from
adherence to a strict money targeting rule under our calibrated model ? The results
shown in Figure 2 suggest that they are far from negligible: thus, a one percent shock
to productivity leads to a change of about 150 basis points in the rate of inflation,
and more than 50 basis points in employment and the output gap (the three variables
remain constant under the optimal policy). On that basis one should conclude that
a money targeting rule is likely to be less desirable than a simple Taylor rule, at least
when technology shocks are the dominant source of fluctuations.
3 The Fed’s Response to Technology Shocks: Evi-
dence
This section provides evidence on the Fed’s systematic response to technology shocks
and its implications for U.S. output, hours and inflation. We also discuss the extent
to which that responses can be accounted for by any of the rules considered in the
previous section.
10This is consistent with the predictions of Galí (1999) and Basu et al. (1999).
11To see this, difference the money demand equation (imposing ∆mt = γm), combine it with (2),
and solve the resulting difference equation forward.
12The reader may notice the connection of that result with the literature on the liquidity effect.
A detailed analysis along those lines can be found in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and
Andrés, López-Salido and Vallés (1999).
13See Galí (2000) for a more detailed analysis of the deviations from optimality implied by money
targeting as well as other policy rules.
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3.1 Identification and Estimation
The empirical effects of technology shocks are determined through the estimation of
a structural VAR. Given that limited objective we do not attempt to identify other
sources of fluctuations. Our identifying restriction is that only technology shocks may
have a permanent effect on the level of labor productivity, as originally proposed in
Galí (1999). That restriction is satisfied in a broad range of business cycle models
under standard assumptions.
Our VARmodel contains four variables: labor productivity, hours, the real interest
rate and inflation. We specify labor productivity in log first differences, in accordance
with the maintained hypothesis of a unit root in that variable. Hours are measured in
log deviations from a linear trend. Both the real rate and inflation enter in levels.14
Our hours series is the log of total employee hours in nonagricultural establish-
ments. Labor productivity was constructed subtracting the previous variable to the
log of GDP. Both, hours and GDP were normalize by working age population. The
nominal interest rate is the three-month Treasury bill rate and the price is mea-
sured with the log of the CPI. All the series used are quarterly and were drawn from
CITIBASE.
Our analysis covers the sample period 1954:I-1998:III. A number of authors have
argued that U.S. monetary policy has experienced important structural changes over
that period. The existing evidence suggests splitting the sample into two subperiods:
the pre-Volcker years and the more recent Volcker-Greenspan era.15 In addition, we
remove the period 79:III-82:II from our analysis, because of the unusual operating
procedures that were effective during that episode.16
Next we describe the evidence, starting with the most recent subperiod.
3.2 The Volcker-Greenspan Era
Figure 3 displays, for the 1982:3-1998:3 period, the estimated response of a num-
ber of variables to a one standard deviation technology shock with their associated
two standard error confidence interval. In addition, it also shows the corresponding
impulse-responses under the optimal policy.17 Figure 4 supplements that evidence
by displaying the acceptance interval for the impulse responses of hours and inflation
under the null hypothesis of a zero response of all horizons.18 That null corresponds
to the optimal responses in our model.
14We have also estimated the VAR model with first differenced hours and inflation. None of the
results were affected.
15See, e.g. Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).
16See Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for formal evidence of the idiosincracy of that period.
17We have calibrated the technology process so it follows a random walk and the size of the shock
is such that the long run response of productivity matches the point estimated obtained with the
VAR.
18The darker bars represent the point estimates of the impulse responses and the lighter bars
represent a (+/-) two standard deviation confidence intervals.
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In Figure 3, we observe an impact jump in the level of productivity of about 0.3
percent. That variable stabilizes at slightly lower level later on. The output response
is of a similar magnitude and sign. As a result, hours are hardly affected by the shock
even though the point estimates suggest a delayed positive effect, but one which is
quantitatively very small. A similar muted responses can be observe in inflation and
interest rates (both nominal and real). Thus, while the estimated impact effect on
real interest rate is slightly positive, we cannot reject the null of a flat response at
zero for both hours and interest rates (nominal and real) as shown in Figure 4. The
latter result suggests that the Fed’s response to technology shocks in the Volcker-
Greenspan period is consistent with the optimal one as implied by our simple sticky
price model.19
3.3 The pre-Volcker Period
Figures 5 and 6 report the corresponding evidence for the pre-Volcker period (1954:I-
1979:II). In Figure 5, the profile of the estimated response of the productivity suggests
the presence of substantial positive autocorrelation in technology in contrast with the
near random walk behavior observed in the Volcker-Greenspan period. Accordingly
the optimal responses display in Figure 5 are based on a calibration of the technology
process that seeks to mimic the estimated productivity response.20
Notice that the initial output response is negative; only after five quarters the
effect becomes positive and keeps building up gradually. The response of hours is
significantly negatively on impact; that effect is reversed only after two years.21 It is
also apparent in the figure that there exists a large deviation between those responses
and the ones associated with the optimal policy. In particular, the response of GDP
remains persistently below the optimal one. This is consistent with the observation of
a persistent negative inflation in response to a positive technology shock, in contrast
with the requirement of price stability implied by the optimal policy. Formal evidence
of the significance of the deviations in hours and inflation from their optimal path
can be seen in Figure 6.
Underlying those results is the response of real interest rate. The latter lies above
the optimal response at most horizons which might explain the gap between the actual
and optimal output responses. Even though the nominal rate is shown to decline in
response to the shock, the size of the reduction falls short that of inflation, which
translates into a persistently higher real rate. In other words, changes in nominal
rate are insufficient to counteract the effect of technology shock on inflation.22
19Notice that (as discussed in the previous section) given that we assume a random walk process
for technology, the optimal response can be supported by a Taylor rule.
20To approximate the observed path of productivity we set ρ = 0.7 in our calibrated model.
21Similar findings were obtained by Galí (1999) and Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1998).
22This is consistent with the estimates of the unconditional interest rates rule for the same period
obtained by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).
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A comparison of the estimated responses for the pre-Volcker period and those
generated by the money rule (see Figure 2) points to many qualitative similarities. In
particular, both lead to too tight a policy in response to a positive technology shock
which destabilizes hours and inflation.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have characterized the Fed’s systematic response to technology shocks
and its implications for U.S. output, hours and inflation. Second we evaluated the
extent to which that responses can be accounted for by a simple rule (including the
optimal one) in the context of a standard business cycle model with sticky prices. Our
main results can be described as follows: First, we detect significant differences across
periods in the response of the economy (as well as the Fed’s) to a technology shock.
Second, the Fed’s response to a technology shock in the Volcker-Greenspan period is
consistent with a optimal monetary policy rule. Third, in the pre-Volcker period the
Fed’s policy tended to over stabilize output at the cost of generating excessive inflation
volatility. Hence our evidence reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting and
improvement in the Fed’s performance.
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Figure 1. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks
Optimal vs Taylor
productivity
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
gdp
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
Optimal Taylor
labor
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
0.200
nominal rate
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
real rate
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Optimal Taylor
inflation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.050
-0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO nº 0013
Figure 2. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks
Optimal vs Money Rule
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Figure 3. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks
Optimal vs. Estimated (Volcker-Greenspan Period)
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Figure 4. Testing the Optimality Hypothesis
Volcker-Greenspan
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Figure 5. The Dynamic Effects of Technology Shocks
Optimal vs. Estimated (Pre Volcker Period)
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Figure 6. Testing the Optimality Hypothesis
Pre Volcker Period
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